Spying with beer

I have a large collection of brewery histories. They are often a frustrating read, concentrating on owning family members or the company's finances. But some are much handier. Providing some real insights. The first volume of Heineken's history falls into the latter category.

Published in 1949, just a few years after the end of the war, the conflict was clearly still in the author's mind. There are some passages which layout the attitude and goals of the C.B.K. (Centraal Brouwerj Kantoor), the Dutch brewers' organisation.

"We have just mentioned two fundamental aspects of the C.B.K. However, the practical side of the unity of the brewing world vis-à-vis the occupying forces must also be emphasized. Initially, the requisitioning of brewery staff took place on an individual basis. Due to the intervention of the management of the C.B.K. However, it has been achieved that such individual actions will not be taken. Afterwards, the C.B.K. also led the Germans to classify the brewery staff and beer merchants as indispensable. Furthermore, the C.B.K. took action when the occupiers took the position of allowing some breweries to continue working and forcing others to close: it was possible to manage that all breweries were allowed to continue working. In order to arrive at this result, reference was made to the mandatory deliveries to the "Wehrmacht", which, however, never amounted to more than 8 percent of the total turnover and guaranteed that sales to Dutch customers, which were always seriously threatened, would continue. It could also be averted by invoking those mandatory deliveries by pointing to Hitler's demand "Bier soll sein" and so too could the threat of copper requisitioning. This was of great significance. In the previous war the copper requisitioning in Belgium had fatal consequences for the brewing industry of our southern neighbors and the consequences for our breweries would certainly have been even more serious in connection with the serious shortage of materials that existed after the Second War."
Korte Geschiedenis der Heineken's Bierbrouwerij Maatschappij N.V. 1873-1948, H. A. Korthals, 1949, pages 390-391.

The primary aim of the C.B.K. was to keep all Dutch breweries open until the end of the war.Specifically, they wanted to avoid the fate og Belgium's breweries in WW I, when most were stripped of their copper by the Germans. Many never to reopen. They managed to convince the Germans that all breweries needed to stay open in order to supply the Whrmacht. Even though only 8% of production was needed. Leaving plenty of beer for Dutch civilians.

Unwisely, the Germans let the C.B.K. organise beer deliveries to German units.

"It is worth mentioning that the regulation of deliveries to the "Wehrmacht" proposed by the C.B.K. enabled the agency to determine almost exactly the strength of the troop concentrations in the various parts of our country. This information was also passed on to the English spy service. The leadership of the C.B.K. had, however, anticipated the possibility of "passing on" the figures when setting up the scheme and, when submitting the proposals in the accompanying letter, it had pointed out - otherwise unspecified - dangers associated with the scheme. When Mr. Stikker was called to account, he was able to point out to the Germans that he had alerted them to possible dangers and furthermore he argued that he could hardly be held responsible for the "leak" in the C.B.K. where no fewer than 70 people worked!"
Korte Geschiedenis der Heineken's Bierbrouwerij Maatschappij N.V. 1873-1948, H. A. Korthals, 1949, page 391.

It seems that the Germans were so keen to let someone else organise their beer for them, that they didn't worry about the information about their troops that was being given away. I wonder exactly how the information was passed on to British intelligence? It's not like they could just call them on the phone. 

(My translation.)